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High Court of Bombay holds that rejection of a complaint of sexual harassment at the threshold is an appealable ‘recommendation’
In Anup Vikal vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors.[1] (“Judgment”), a single judge bench of the High Court of Bombay (“Bombay HC”) held that a decision of an Internal Committee (“IC”) rejecting a complaint at the threshold for lacking a sexual element, without holding any inquiry, constitutes a ‘recommendation’ in terms of Section 13(2) of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (“PoSH Act”), and is therefore appealable under Section 18 of the PoSH Act.
Beyond its detailed statutory analysis, the decision carries an important practical takeaway for employers: an IC’s decision to reject a complaint at the threshold may face appellate scrutiny and must therefore rest on clear and defensible reasoning.
Brief facts
A General Counsel who had resigned from Maple Infra InvIT Investment Manager Private Limited filed a complaint alleging sexual harassment with the IC on October 28, 2023, while her exit was being finalised. Given her objection to the Presiding Officer of the IC on conflict grounds, the complaint was forwarded to the IC’s external member. On October 30, 2023, shortly after the complaint was forwarded to the external member, the IC informed her by email that the allegations did not have a ‘sexual element’ and fell outside its jurisdiction. Her employment was terminated the same evening.
The complainant appealed to the Industrial Court, Mumbai under Section 18 of the PoSH Act. The respondents objected that, since no inquiry had been held, there was no ‘recommendation’ capable of being appealed. The Industrial Court rejected the objection, set aside the IC’s communication and remanded the matter to the IC for inquiry. The respondents challenged this order before the Bombay HC.
Issue
One of the key issues before the Bombay HC was whether the IC’s communication to the complainant, informing her that her complaint did not involve an element of sexual harassment and therefore fell outside the IC’s jurisdiction, is a ‘recommendation’ that can be appealed under Section 18 of the PoSH Act, even though the IC held no inquiry?
Statutory provisions and the gap
Section 18(1) of the PoSH Act does not confer a general right of appeal against every decision of the IC; rather, it confines the appeal to the recommendations listed in it, which include recommendations under Sections 13(2) and 13(3) of the PoSH Act. These sub-Sections deal with instances of IC “arriving at the conclusion that allegation against the respondent” has been proved or not proved. Such a conclusion ordinarily follows only after the IC completes an inquiry and submits a report of its findings to the employer under Section 13(1) of the PoSH Act.
Read literally, therefore, a rejection of a complaint at the threshold could appear to fall outside these provisions. Because the IC completes no inquiry, such a rejection is unlikely to qualify as a ‘recommendation’ under Section 13 of the PoSH Act, and Section 18 of the PoSH Act would therefore not make it appealable.
Findings and analysis
The Bombay HC noted that, since the PoSH Act creates a statutory right of appeal, an appeal under Section 18 of the PoSH Act lies only against the listed recommendations, including those under Sections 13(2) and 13(3) of the PoSH Act. Accordingly, not every action or decision of the IC is appealable under Section 18 of the PoSH Act. On this basis, the Petitioners contended that a recommendation under Section 13(2) of the PoSH Act can be made only after the inquiry is conducted and completed, and that a threshold rejection, made without any inquiry, is therefore not appealable.
The Bombay HC acknowledged that, on a standalone reading of Section 13 of the PoSH Act, the Petitioners’ contention ‘may appear to be correct’. However, the Bench held that a literal and strict interpretation of Section 13 of the PoSH Act may defeat the legislative intent, and that the IC’s failure to hold an inquiry would not take its decision outside the ambit of a ‘recommendation’ for the purposes of an appeal. The Bench also noted that, if such a decision were not treated as a ‘recommendation’, an IC could defeat the appellate remedy by rejecting every complaint at the threshold, leaving an aggrieved woman without a remedy. The beneficial nature of the statute therefore calls for a liberal interpretation.
The Bombay HC’s reasoning rests on Section 11(1) of the PoSH Act, which provides that the IC ‘shall’ proceed to inquire into a complaint. The Bench read this as a mandatory duty and not a discretion; and held that Sections 11 and 13 of the PoSH Act must be read together. Viewed thus, a decision of the IC on a complaint, whether reached after an inquiry or without one, assumes the character of a ‘recommendation’.
The Bombay HC also tested this reasoning against the converse situation. In the event the IC, without holding any inquiry, recommends termination of employment, such a communication would equally be a ‘recommendation’ under Section 13(3) of the PoSH Act. The delinquent employee would be entitled to appeal against such ‘recommendation’ under Section 18 of the PoSH Act. The interpretation is, therefore, not confined only to complainants; it ensures that a decision of the IC, in whichever direction it falls, remains subject to appellate scrutiny.
The ruling does not, however, dilute the jurisdictional threshold under the PoSH Act. The Bombay HC accepted that an IC’s jurisdiction is limited to complaints of sexual harassment as defined in Section 2(n) of the PoSH Act, read with the circumstances in Section 3 of the PoSH Act thereof, and that a grievance not involving allegations of sexual harassment need not even be referred to the IC.
The Bench also drew support from Sharanjeet Kaur vs. IDBI Bank Ltd.,[2] wherein the High Court of Delhi held that an appeal lies even when a complaint is dismissed without a fact-finding inquiry. However, unlike this Judgment, this decision did not explain in detail why the IC’s closure of a complaint, qualifies as ‘recommendation’.
Conclusion
The significance of this Judgment lies in how it closes the apparent gap that a literal reading of Sections 13 and 18 of the PoSH Act leaves. By anchoring the analysis in the mandatory language of Section 11(1) of the PoSH Act, rather than in the outcome of the inquiry, the Bombay HC makes the nature of the decision determinative of whether an appeal lies, notwithstanding if the procedure is followed or not. The converse example discussed by the Bombay HC also shows that the interpretation is not confined to complainants. A decision of the IC, in whichever direction it falls, remains subject to appellate scrutiny.
Although not referenced or cited in this Judgment, the ruling appears to be aligned with Debdulal Maity vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors.[3], where the High Court of Calcutta held that Sections 9, 10 and 11 of the PoSH Act require the IC to apply its mind at the outset to whether a complaint falls within Section 2(n) thereof. Read together, Debdulal Maity (supra) recognises the IC’s power to screen a complaint at the threshold, and this Judgment makes a rejection, at that stage, a recommendation open to appeal. The power to screen and the right of appeal therefore operate together.
By comparison, Sharanjeet Kaur (supra), on which the Bombay HC relied, did not examine in detail why the closure of a complaint by the IC qualifies as a ‘recommendation’. This Judgment supplies that reasoning through its combined reading of Sections 11, 13 and 18 of the PoSH Act.
The significance of the Judgment lies less in its outcome than in what its reasoning implies. If every decision of the IC on a complaint is a ‘recommendation’, then the form of the decision, whether described as a ‘closure’, a finding of ‘no jurisdiction’ or otherwise, is unlikely to protect it from review. A decision not to inquire is, on this view, as much a decision on the complaint as a decision reached after inquiry and may be appealed within 90 (ninety) days under Section 18(2) of the PoSH Act.
For employers, this places greater weight on how the IC records a threshold decision. Since an appellate authority may examine such a decision, it will test the decision on the reasons the IC records. A decision that identifies the allegations considered and explains why they fall outside Section 2(n) read with Section 3 of the PoSH Act is far more likely to survive appeal than a bare statement that the complaint has no sexual element. As observed in Debdulal Maity, a decision of the IC taken hastily and without application of mind is vulnerable to being set aside.
The role of employers lies in equipping the IC to discharge its functions properly. Employers should ensure that IC members undergo adequate and periodic training. Members should be apprised of judicial developments such as this Judgment and Debdulal Maity (supra) and should have clarity on how the IC addresses and redresses complaints. This includes giving due weightage to principles of natural justice, and the need to record reasons for any decision not to proceed with an inquiry. Training of this kind supports the IC’s independence and helps its decisions withstand appellate scrutiny.
This Prism has been prepared by:
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Gerald Manoharan |
Sonakshi Das |
Mayank Jain |
For more details, please contact km@jsalaw.com.
[1] W.P. 7430/2026 (decided on August 19, 2026)
[2] 2024 SCC OnLine Del 3918
[3] 2014 SCC OnLine Cal 17152
